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Everything we hear is an opinion, not a fact. Everything we see is a perspective, not the 
truth. 
Marcus Aurelius  
Roman Emperor 161-180 AD 
 
 
What Role Did the Sassanid Empire 
Truly Play in the Fall of the Western 
Roman Empire?  
Exploring Divergences in Causal Frameworks 
Nicholas Strunc 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to add to the existing body of literature regarding the decline and fall 
of the Western Roman Empire by introducing the contributions of the Sassanid Empire to 
the literary discussion. The argument of this thesis will be that the Sassanid Empire 
exacerbated structural weaknesses in several facets of the Roman imperial system to an 
extent that the Sassanid Empire must be considered a necessary and contributory cause in 
the decline and fall of the Western Roman Empire. The source evidence will be drawn 
from contemporary literary sources, archeological evidence, and numismatic analysis. 
This thesis will not posit a monocausal argument regarding the Sassanid Empire and its 
effect on the fall of the Western Roman Empire, rather it will emphasize the role that the 
Sassanid Empire must play in a more nuanced and multi-causal thesis on the subject.   
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Introduction 
….all the warriors were summoned and there was a hand-to-hand contest with drawn 
swords; blood streamed on all sides from the vast carnage; the trenches were blocked 
with bodies and so a broader path was furnished. And now the city was filled with the 
eager rush of the enemy's forces, and since all hope of defense or of flight was cut off, 
armed and unarmed alike without distinction of sex were slaughtered like so many 
cattle.
1
 
This passage from Ammianus Marcellinus’s historical account of Roman Late 
Antiquity, the Res Gestae, describes the siege and fall of Amida, a fortress city on the 
Eastern frontier, to the troops of Shapur II, ruler of the Sassanid Empire, in AD 359. This 
ancient city, located in modern day Turkey, was a cornerstone of the Roman imperial 
defense against the armies of the Sassanid Empire on the eastern frontiers.2 Ammianus, a 
4th century Roman military officer, describes the Sassanid king as driven by emotion and 
aggression and asserts that the Sassanid army is barbaric in its origin and worthy of fear.  
But night put an end to the conflict; and having taken a nap during the brief period of 
rest, the king, as soon as dawn appeared, boiling with wrath and resentment and closing 
his eyes to all right, aroused the barbarians against us, to win what he hoped for.
3 
…we believe that the famous "sons of earth" did not come forth from the bosom of the 
land, but were born with extraordinary swiftness - those so-called sparti, who, because 
they were seen unexpectedly in sundry places, were thought to have sprung from the 
earth, since antiquity gave the matter a fabulous origin.
4 
These vivid descriptions of the threat of a Sassanid army and such fearful prose 
from a man like Ammianus suggests that the Sassanid Empire was aggressive, driven by 
the passions of it kings, and willing to sacrifice blood and treasure to defeat the Romans.  
                                                        
1 Ammianus Marcellinus, Res Gestae. In Res Gestae: Loeb Classical Library Edition.  
Translated by J.C. Rolfe. Accessed from 
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Ammian/home.html 5/6/15 
@ 8:51 pm xix.8. 
2 Ammianus, Res Gestae xix.8.1. 
3 Ammianus, Res Gestae xix.8. 
4 Ammianus, Res Gestae xix.8. 
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Over the past decade, differing scholarly views have emerged regarding the role 
of the Sassanid Empire and the fall of the Western Roman Empire. 
Peter Heather in his 2005-book The Fall of the Roman Empire asserts that the 
catalyst for the decline of the Roman Empire and the eventual fall of Western Roman 
Empire was the emergence of the Sassanid Persian Empire out of the ashes of the 
Parthian Empire: 
The Sassanids were sufficiently powerful and internally cohesive to push back Roman 
legions from the Euphrates and from much of Armenia and Southeast Turkey. Much as 
modern readers tend to think of the “Huns” as the nemesis of the Roman Empire, for the 
entire period under discussion it was the Persians who held the attention and concern of 
Rome and Constantinople.
5
 
Adrian Goldsworthy (2009) presents a contrasting view regarding the Sassanid 
threat in his book, How Rome Fell: Death of a Superpower. He argues that the fall of the 
Western Roman Empire was a result of repeated blows to a decaying state over a long 
period of time.  
The Roman Empire continued for a very long time. At times the empire could still be 
formidable and did not simply collapse. Perhaps we should imagine the late Roman 
Empire as a retired athlete, whose body has decline from neglect and an unhealthy 
lifestyle. Over the years the person would grow weaker and weaker, and in the end could 
easily succumb to disease. Long decline was the fate of the Roman Empire. In the end, it 
may well have been ‘murdered’ by barbarian invaders, but these struck at a body made 
vulnerable by prolonged decay.
6
 
 
Both authors make arguments that incorporate the barbarian threats of the tribes 
and confederations along the Rhine and Danube, they both include internal weaknesses 
associated with extensive Roman imperialism, but only Heather develops the Sassanids 
as a significant part of his causal framework.  
                                                        
5 Peter Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the 
Barbarians (Oxford: Oxford Univesity Press, 2006), 60. 
6 Adrian Goldsworthy, How Rome Fell: Death of a Superpower (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009), 414-415. 
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I will argue that the Sassanid Empire was a necessary, but not the sole, causal 
factor in the fall of the Western Roman Empire. The Sassanid Empire exacerbated 
existing structural weaknesses (military, economic, social and political) within the 
Roman Empire. Furthermore, these conditions opened the gates for other destructive or 
erosive insults to the Empire, such as barbarian invasions and internal strife to proliferate, 
leading to the decline and fall of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century. In 
arguing this, I will attempt to bridge the gap between the arguments of these two authors 
and create a more robust framework for understanding the role that the Sassanid Empire 
truly played in the fall of the Western Roman Empire.  
 In order to reconcile these divergent views, I will use the following road map. The 
first substantive chapter of this thesis will give an overview of Roman-Sassanid relations, 
providing a groundwork for understanding Romano-Sassanid relations both in the context 
of war and the context of peace. This chapter will also include references to Rome’s 
relationship with the Parthians, highlighting the paradigm shift that occurred with the 
Sassanid toppling of the Parthian Empire. The second chapter will focus on the third 
century crisis and the role that the Sassanid Empire played in facilitating and 
exacerbating it. The third chapter will attend to 4th century developments touching upon 
the development of Roman fortresses along the Mesopotamian frontier and major Roman 
and Sassanid military campaigns as well as the development of commercial and socio-
economic transfers in the periods of peace between these campaigns. Finally, this thesis 
will focus on late 4th-century and early and mid 5th-century barbarian developments and 
how the Sassanids provided a fatal distraction for the Romans from these threats. This 
chapter will also include a coalescence of the centuries of Romano-Sassanid interactions, 
 7 
as outlined in previous chapters, and provide a robust conclusion as to why the Sassanid 
Empire was a necessary causal factor for the fall of the Western Roman Empire. 
 To make this argument, I will be forced to rely on a set of contemporary sources 
that are incomplete or otherwise unduly biased. Authors like Cassius Dio and Ammianus 
Marcellinus will be featured prominently in this thesis and this presents a problem. A 
heavy reliance on Roman literature has the potential to skew facts with a decidedly 
Roman slant. Very little Sassanid literary evidence exists to balance out this equation, 
therefore, my source methodology will be diverse, including Roman and Sassanid 
numismatic evidence as well as Roman and Sassanid archaeological evidence.   
Roman and Sassanid archeological remains that will be analyzed range from 
building and fort sites along the Syrian frontier with the Sassanid Empire, to Trajan’s 
column, to Sassanid triumphal column etchings. Coinage will act as another mode of 
diversification for source evidence but like literary evidence it is slightly problematic. 
Coins were often used as a propaganda tool, thus coinage can present unduly biased 
accounts of significant events. However, this propaganda can yield a neat synthesis of 
social and political situations in the eras that the coins were minted. For example, a 
Sassanid bronze hexachalkon or tetradrachm from the 3rd century depicts the Sassanid 
kind Shapur I on one side and the defeated emperor Valerian on the other, providing a 
balance to the Roman contemporary accounts of Valerian’s campaign against the 
Sassanids.7 Also, the metal content of coins changed over time depending on the relative 
ratio of precious metals to other non-precious metals and this will allow for an analysis of 
                                                        
7 SIC, Shapur I, 240-271 CEhexachalkon [bronze], acquired in Pakistan, crude aG  
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the relative gradation of the value of coins over time in both the Roman and Sassanid 
Empires.   
 The causal frameworks for the fall of the Western Roman Empire should face 
continual scrutiny and assumptions must be dusted off and reanalyzed for the Roman 
Empire was one of the longest lasting major power in world history and its legacy is still 
felt throughout the world, particularly the western world. But more than its influence on 
language, culture, notions of warfare, civic participation, and other aspects of everyday 
life, the Roman Empire and the fall of its western half might teach us about what makes a 
powerful state flourish and what can cause it to fail. What role did the Sassanid Empire 
truly play in the fall of the Western Roman Empire?  
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Chapter 1: Tension, The Framework of Romano-Sassanid 
Relations 
 
Introduction 
 
In a letter from the emperor Severus Alexander to Ardashir, the founder and first 
king of the Sassanid Empire in the 220s, Alexander warns Ardashir to respect peace and 
reminded him of the great victories of Augustus, Trajan, and Septimius Severus.8 In 
response to this letter, Ardashir requested that Rome withdraw from Syria and Asia 
Minor.9 This simple exchange of letters is very telling of the relationship that would 
develop over time between the Roman Emperors and Sassanid Kings. While at times 
these two powers would interact peacefully, the official imperial Roman line as well as 
the official Sassanid line was antagonistic.  
The pages that follow will attempt to answer the question: How did the Sassanid 
Empire come to be and what was the nature of the Sassanid Empire’s relationship with 
the Roman Empire? In order to answer this question, I will discuss the emergence of the 
Sassanid Empire out of the Parthian Empire and the evolving relations between it and the 
Roman Empire from the 3rd to the 5th centuries. 
The contemporary literary sources of this period are mostly Roman in origin and 
the authors of the period include Cassius Dio, Herodian, Ammianus Marcellinus, 
Procopius, and Agathis. These authors concentrate particularly on Roman-Persian 
(Sassanid) warfare, and though much peaceful interaction occurred as well, the Roman 
contemporary preoccupation with warfare reinforces the view that the Romano-Sassanid 
                                                        
8 Herodian. Roman History. in Herodian of Antioch’s History of the Roman Empire.  
Translated by Edward C. Echols. (LA: University of Berkeley Press, 2007), VI.ii.4-5. 
9 Herodian, Roman History, VI.ii.5-6. 
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relationship was dominated by warfare. 10  Numerous inscriptions boasting of the 
accomplishments and victories of Sassanid rulers like Ardashir, Shapur I, and Narses also 
paint a similar picture on the Sassanid side.11   
The Fall of the Parthians: The Second Century Crisis  
 
In the year AD 226, Ardashir, the founder of the Sassanid dynasty was crowned 
king of kings in his new capital of Ctesiphon. This ended a long period of internal strife 
in Mesopotamia and the Khorasan (Iran) that began with Trajan’s eastern campaign. 
From the years AD 114 to 117, Trajan managed to annex Armenia, which was a client 
kingdom of the Parthians at the time, annex northern Mesopotamia, and install a puppet 
ruler in the rest of Mesopotamia. In doing so, he cut the Parthian Empire off from its 
most fertile and prosperous province and took the Parthian capital, Ctesiphon. Trajan died 
in AD 117 before renewing war and was not able to destroy the Parthians outright.12 
Trajan set a precedent whereby wars of aggression became the policy norm of Roman 
emperors regarding the Eastern Frontier. This aggressive stance towards the East 
continued on after the fall of the Parthians and one question that will be remarked on later 
in this thesis will be: what motivated Roman emperors to invade Parthian, and later 
Sassanid, territory?  
 War did not break out again until AD 161 when the Parthian king Vologases IV 
attacked Armenia. This indicates that war between Rome and the Parthians was not 
constant, but rather was punctuated by long stretches of peace. The result of this war was 
                                                        
10 Jan William Drijvers, Rome and the Sasanid Empire: Confrontation and Coexistence 
(Brussels: Rousseau, 2008), 442. 
11 See Rustam, Naqsh-I Res gestae divi Saporis for illustrative examples  
12 Rose Mary Sheldon, Rome’s Wars in Parthia: Blood in the Sand (London: Vallentine 
Mitchell, 2010), 143. 
 11
another invasion of Mesopotamia this time by Roman general Avidius Cassius (Hadrian 
had abandoned the holdings captured under Trajan). Cassius won battles at Dura-Europos 
and Seleucia and he eventually managed to assault and sack Ctesiphon in AD 165.13 In 
AD 195 another Roman invasion of Mesopotamia, under emperor Septimius Severus led 
to Roman reacquisition of northern Mesopotamia and the third sacking of Ctesiphon in 
AD 197. 14  One last war occurred in AD 216 under emperor Caracalla, the most 
significant event of which was the sacking of Arbela, in northern Mesopotamia, in AD 
215.  
 The Parthian Empire was a decentralized, feudal system akin to the Perso-
Hellenic hybrid system of government used by the Seleucid Empire before them. 
Territories of the empire were divided into three provincial hierarchies, marzbān, xšatrap, 
and dizpat. These three distinct units are similar to the Seleucid designations of satrapy, 
eparchy, and hyparchy.15 These designations generally were akin to vassal states that 
were nominally under the control of the central Parthian administration but day to day 
power was held by prominent noble families who ruled over large estates and supplied 
soldiers and tribute to the king.16 This quasi-feudalist structure was also married with the 
incorporation of semi-autonomous kingdoms, including: Armenia, Media Atropatene, 
                                                        
13 Martin Sicker, “The Struggle over the Euphrates Frontier,” The Pre Islamic Middle 
East 14, no. 2 (2000): 167-168. 
14 George Rawlinson, Parthia (NY: Cosimo Inc., 2007), 337-338. 
15 Geo Widengren, “Sources of Parthian and Sasanian History” in Yarshater, Ehsan 
Cambridge History of Iran (London & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 
1263. 
16 James R. Ashley, The Macedonian Empire: The Era of Warfare Under Philip II and 
Alexander the Great, 359-323 BC (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2004), 385-391. 
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Gordyene, Adiaben, Edessa, Hatra, and Persis.17 In addition to large swaths of territory 
with varying degrees of autonomy, there were a number of Hellenic style city-states of 
some considerable size. 18  These city-states were also granted varying degrees of 
autonomy. This system worked when the royal family had the prestige and legitimacy to 
coopt these many regional mezzanine rulers. It broke down when the royal family lost 
that sway over the nobility and autonomous vassals. This is what occurred as a result of 
the string of second century successes of the Romans against the Parthians. 
The Parthian Empire, quite differently from the Roman Empire, had no standing 
army, but rather utilized levies, mercenaries, fealty-sworn nobles, and personal retinues 
in times of war. The only forces that were maintained full time were the garrisons of 
border forts and the king’s personal retinue that was comprised of nobles, serfs, and 
mercenaries.19  Neither of these pools of active troops was very large, however, the kings 
of the Parthian Empire were able to marshal troops and create armies remarkably quickly. 
The ability to levy troops was a function, in this system, of the personality of the king in 
power and the legitimacy of the royal family. Repeated defeats by the Romans robbed the 
Parthian leadership of much of the mechanism by which its military functioned, control 
over territorial levies.   
 These wars, primarily successes for the Romans, were hammer blows against 
Parthian economic power as well. In ravaging Mesopotamia multiple times over the 
                                                        
17 V.G. Lukonin, “Political Social and Administrative Institutions: Taxes and Trade” in 
Cambridge History of Iran edited by Ehsan Yarshater (London & New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 701. 
18 Klaus Schippmann, “Arsacids II: the Arsacid Dynasty,” Encyclopedia Iranica (New 
York: Routledge, 1987), 532. 
19 David Kennedy, “Parthia and Rome: Eastern Perspectives,” The Roman Army in the 
East (Anne Arbor: Cushing Malloy Inc., 1996), 84. 
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second century, the Romans denied the Parthians much of the agricultural and trade 
surpluses of Mesopotamia. Thus, the unsuccessful defense of the Parthian Empire by 
sitting kings of the second century eroded much of their imperial authority leading to the 
instability in Parthian politics. 
The Cost of Defeat: The Rise of the Sassanid Empire 
 
Ardashir was the head of a Persian noble family from Estakhr, a village in modern 
day southern Iran. Taking advantage of the protracted instability of the Parthian system, 
Ardashir managed to consolidate his rule over several Parthian vassal states. Eventually, 
the military forces of the Parthian king Artabanus V confronted him. Ardashir won 
several victories against the Parthian army and in last battle of Hormizdeghan in AD 224 
the Parthian king was killed.20 After the king’s death, Ardashir secured his rule over the 
holdings of the Parthian Empire and in doing so set up a new dynasty named for his 
ancestor Sasan.21 
This empire supplanted its Parthian predecessors in the 220s and set the stage for 
a new period of warfare in the East for the Romans. A mere six years after creating the 
Sassanid Empire, Ardashir backed up his antagonistic request made in response to 
Alexander Severus with action. In AD 230, he invaded Roman territory, besieging 
Nisibis, and undertaking raids that led as far as Syria and Cappadocia.22 The following 
narrative comes from Herodian and gives a good idea of the damage that this campaign 
caused: 
                                                        
20 W.B. Fischer et al, The Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), 116-118. 
21 John Morris Roberts, A Short History of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993), 145. 
22 Herodian, Roman History, VI.ii.1. 
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Although the barbarians seemed to have been victorious through the help of some 
superior numbers, they were still worn out by the many clashes in Media and the battle in 
Parthia, where many had died and even more had been wounded. Almost, the same 
number of soldiers had fallen on both sides and the surviving barbarian soldiers seem to 
have won because of their number and not their force.
23 
 
Herodian, a Roman civil servant and possibly a senator, is someone who would have had 
access to Roman imperial status reports as well as official imperial propaganda decrees, 
thus his account provides a good contrast between the “official” line on this war as well 
as the “unofficial” account of events.24 This account is revealing for a few reasons. First, 
the mention of Sassanid “superior force” indicates that Ardashir campaigned with a force 
that was larger than the one available to Severus Alexander. Second, the fact that 
Sassanid raids reached as far as “Syria” and “Cappadocia” indicates that the Sassanids, at 
least on a smaller more temporary scale, were capable of penetrating deeply into the heart 
of Roman Eastern territories. Lastly, Herodian claims that the Romans and Sassanids lost 
the “same number of soldiers” and if this is taken in conjunction with the first part of the 
excerpt that described the Sassanid army as numerically superior, this indicates that this 
campaign had been destructive to the Roman legionary rank and file.  
 Following this war, the Sassanids attacked again in AD 238 and made inroads 
against the Romans. In AD 240, Ardashir managed to capture the city of Hatra, a 
strategic trading and commercial hub of Northern Mesopotamia. 25  This episode is 
interesting because it was indicative of not only political/military considerations (Hatra 
occupies a key entry and exit point to the deserts of Northern Arabia) but also 
                                                        
23 Herodian, Roman History, VI.vi.5-6.  
24 See Herodian’s knowledge of senatus consultum tacitum as well as account of 
Herodian’s reliability in Zosimus Historia Nova and John of Antioch World Chronicle 
25 Anonymous, Codex Manichaicus Coloniensis, XVIII.1-16. 
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commercial considerations. This theme of commercial wars will become very important 
for future discussion of Roman Sassanid relations in the 4th and 5th centuries. 
Following this victory, Ardashir’s son Shapur I succeeded to the throne and was 
faced with a Roman counterattack under the emperor Gordian III. There is a slight point 
of contention here as western contemporary sources indicate that a second Sassanid 
invasion prompted Gordian’s counterattack.26 Nevertheless, this campaign proved to be a 
bloody contest whose end result was the destruction of Gordian’s army and Gordian’s 
death as well.27 In the wake of this disaster a man named Philip was declared emperor 
and forced to pay a large indemnity to the Sassanids. 
Draining Imperial Strength: Warfare with the Sassanids 
 
 The third century saw several more wars between the Romans and the Sassanids. 
In AD 252-53 Shapur I launched an attack on Rome’s eastern provinces devastating Syria 
and sacking Antioch. In his third campaign, Shapur I launched further raids into Syria, 
Cilicia, and Cappadocia, in the process capturing the emperor Valerian.28 Evidence of 
this event can be seen in a triumphal relief at Bīšāpūr representing Shapur I’s victory 
against Valerian.29 After this event, men like Septimius Odaenathus, a dynast of Palmyra, 
carved out large portions of the Eastern and Western provinces as part of the “Gallic” and 
                                                        
26 Anonymous, Scriptores Historiae Augustae, Gordian, In Historia Augusta, Vol. I, 
Translated by David Magie (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1921) XXVI.6 
27 The Shapur Inscription on the Ka’ba-I Zardust at Naqs-I Rustam § 6 & 7. 
28 Michael Grant, The Collapse and Recovery of the Roman Empire (London: Routledge, 
1999), 20.  
29 R. Ghirshman, “Triumphal relief of Šāpūr I at Bīšāpūr,” In Iran, Parthians and  
Sassanians, Edited by R. Ghirshman (London: Thames and Hudson, 1962). 
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“Palmyrene Empires”. 30  In many ways, the Sassanid Empire was to Rome’s Third 
Century Crisis, what the Romans were to the Parthians in their Second Century Crisis.  
 While scholars both contemporary and modern tended to focus on these periods of 
active warfare between the Romans and Sassanids, it is important to acknowledge that 
there were periods of relative peace between these two powers. Even in times of peace, 
however, significant Roman resources were allocated to the active defense of the Eastern 
frontier as well as the construction or repair of frontline fortifications. These fortresses, 
created by a string of 4th century emperors, were constructed as a part of a system of 
heavily defended strongpoints meant to break up and tire out Sassanid armies. 
 The case of Shapur II’s invasion of Northern Mesopotamia provides a good 
illustrative example of the difficulties of this fortress system for the Romans. According 
to Ammianus Marcellinus, the Roman emperor Constantius was given information that 
the Sassanid King Shapur II planned an invasion of the Northern Mesopotamia. 
Constantius did not maneuver a sufficient number of troops to check this invasion and 
this permitted the Sassanids to bypass the key fortress of Nisibis and march into Syria.31  
Shapur II did not march directly to Syria, however, as he was provoked into 
laying siege to the fortress city of Amida.32 This opening of Shapur II’s campaign lays 
bare two distinct disadvantages of relying on a fortress system for frontier defense. First, 
the Sassanids, if their objectives were in Syria, Asia Minor, or Egypt, could bypass large 
fortresses and avoid long drawn out sieges. Second, if they did attempt to siege a fortress, 
                                                        
30 Grant, Collapse and Recovery, 20. 
31 A.D. Lee, Information and Frontiers: Roman Foreign Relations in Late Antiquity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 108. 
32 R.C. Brockley, “Ammianus Marcellinus on the Persian invasion of A.D. 359,” Phoenix 
42, no. 1 (1988): 244-260. 
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the Sassanids had developed sophisticated siege craft. By the 4th century, the Sassanids 
could press home and capture a fortified city, destroying both the Roman garrison and the 
fortress in the process.33  
The siege lasted 73 days and the capture of the fortress represented a serious loss 
to both the Romans and Sassanids. Shapur II’s army sustained casualties in the 10,000s, a 
not insignificant portion of his army, whereas the Romans lost a key border fortress as 
well as a civilian population of 20,000 and seven legions and several cavalry 
detachments.34 The identification of these units can allow for a rough estimate of the 
Roman military casualties. A typical late Roman legion was composed of 1,000 soldiers 
and cavalry vexillationes numbered between 300-500.35 Therefore, the loss of these units 
can yield a conservative estimate of casualties between 10,000-15,000.  
 Though the fortress at Amida was captured, it represented a Pyrrhic victory for 
Shapur II who, though he advanced further and took another fortress at Singara, was 
unable to sustain his campaign and was forced to retreat.36 The fall of Singara was also 
costly for the Romans as it represented the slaughter of the local populace (which would 
have retreated behind the walls of Singara) and two legions.37 In conclusion, while these 
fortresses fulfilled their objective of slowing and tiring out the Sassanid invasion force, it 
came at a serious cost in manpower, raw resources, coin (secured in the fortresses), and 
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the fortresses themselves, which were expensive to create. What did these expenses look 
like? 
Financial and Manpower Challenges for Rome 
 
 In order to more accurately determine the expenses or warfare on the Eastern 
frontier, we will look at the case study of Dura-Europos. Dura-Europos was originally 
under the control of the Parthians, but was captured by the Romans in AD 165. The 
Romans then constructed fortifications and built out the amenities of the city. In AD 256, 
however, the Sassanids captured the city and the site was abandoned.38 Archeological 
digs that began in 1920 reveal that Dura was surrounded by a defensive wall of mud-
brick and contained an amphitheater, agora, baths, and several temples. It also included a 
large military quarter separated from the main city by another mud brick wall.39  
Using logistical analyses of Donald Engels (1978) for the Macedonian Army 
under Alexander the Great, we can gain some insight into the costs of supplying a 
garrison of several thousand troops and the cost of constructing the fortress that housed 
them. 40  The estimated monthly consumption of a pre-Tetrarchy imperial legion 
(numbering 5,000 men) was 225 tons of grain and 450 kg of forage (fodder) for horses).41 
If this number is used as a reference point for later Roman legions of roughly 1,000 men, 
then the supplies needed for the permanent garrison (2,000) plus contingents of several 
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thousand legionaries and cavalrymen could have been as high as 250 to 300 tons of grain 
and 2,250 kg of fodder per month.4243 This fortress, given the garrison force, could be 
compared to a typical Roman legion fort (which would have house a legion of 5,000 
men) and would have required 15,000 cubic meters of stone, 5,000 cubic meters of clay, 
and 21 ha of turf to build.44  
Given these material requirements, we are now in a position to understand the 
costs of material in coin. At the time of the construction of the fortifications of Dura 
Europos to counter the forces of Shapur I (c. 256), the cost of a modius of grain, 8.73 
liters was 40 nummi.45 The gold solidus of that time, currency delineated in gold was the 
primary means of state bulk expenses, had the purchasing power of 7,200 nummi and thus 
could buy 30-40 modii of wheat.46 With 1 ton of wheat equal to approximately 150 modii 
the cost of supplying grain for one month to Dura-Europos can reasonably be estimated 
to be 1,050 solidii.  
 Calculating construction costs is slightly more problematic. Figures for the cost of 
stone, clay, and other building materials are nonexistent and determining substitute 
metrics for understanding the costs are hampered by fluctuations in price as a result of 
inflation, transportation costs, and the cost of labor. As a stretch it is possible to rectify 
this gap in archeological and numismatic evidence by comparing the costs of aqueduct 
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construction to fort construction. Both were built of similar materials and required a 
similar level of architectural expertise.  The Aqua Marcia, Rome’s third aqueduct, built 
with the plunder from the Pyrrhic War, cost roughly 2,000,000 sesterces per kilometer of 
construction.47 Dura-Europos was roughly 0.49km2 therefore the creation of a stone wall 
consistent with the construction techniques of the Aqua Marcia yields a cost, again very 
rough, of 1,000,000 sesterces.48 This cost sounds relatively reasonable but, adjusted for 
the inflation of the Roman currency from the time of the Pyrrhic War (c. 275 BC) to the 
4th century AD, the cost is several multitudes higher than that original 1,000,000 sesterces 
amount. Without delving into the costs of fodder and the wages of the garrison soldiers 
themselves, it can be understood that any reasonably sized fortress represented a 
significant cost to the Roman Empire. 
 In the later Roman Empire, much of the Roman Army’s recruitment was done 
through conscription, thus replacing the losses of such battles as the siege of Amida or 
Singara was limited only by the availability and cooptability of the recruitment area of a 
legion.49 What presented the highest cost was the arming of new legionaries. Though the 
cost of equipment was deducted from a soldiers pay, the Roman state needed to pay the 
cost to maintain extensive armory works.50 In the mid-second century, evidence exists as 
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well of alterations to the basic legionary kit, the elimination of the leather pteruges.51 
Legionaries were heavy infantry soldiers that fought in close order, group formation, thus 
a reduction in protection is indicative of attempts by the Roman state to create a more 
cost-effective means of arming legionaries on a large scale.52  
Tensions Beyond War: Extra-Martial Interplay Between Two Empires 
 
War with the Sassanids proved to be very expensive as well as a consistent 
enterprise for centuries.  War was not constant, however, as much of the 4th and 5th 
centuries were characterized by long periods of peace. This facilitated the creation of a 
complex diplomatic process to bridge the gaps between wars and peace. Complex rituals 
and formalized methods of communication developed to accommodate the intense 
interactions between the Roman and Sassanid empires. When a new ruler ascended to 
either throne, for example, it was the custom to send an embassy to the other court to 
announce the accession; ambassadors enjoyed special privileges; their baggage was 
exempt from custom duties, and when they reached the frontier, the government to which 
they were sent provided for their journey to the capital and defrayed their expenses. For 
important negotiations men of high rank were chosen and were distinguished as "great 
ambassadors" from the envoys of inferior position who were employed in matters of less 
importance.53 
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 As a result of warfare, and the subsequent diplomatic processes behind its 
resolution, came interplay between the nobility of the Sassanids and Romans. Men of 
high birth, sent on diplomatic mission, provided a catalyst for the exchange of ideas and 
customs. An unexpected consequence of this antagonistic relationship between the 
Roman and Sassanid Empires was a gradual adaptation of certain elements of Sassanid 
society by the Romans. This exchange was facilitated by the fact that Syriac, an Aramaic 
dialect, was the lingua franca, of the exchange in the eastern border provinces both 
Roman and Sassanid.54 Exchanges of religious views, cultural norms, as well as royal 
trappings, were common. Sassanid court rituals, for example, made their way into the 
Roman court repertoire, as did architectural construction, form, and ornamentation, and 
artistic motifs. Extrapolations regarding this subject of Roman-Sassanid extra-military 
interactions will take place in a later chapter. 
In stepping back to get a bigger picture of the interactions between the Sassanid 
Empire and the Roman Empire, from 226 to the end of the Western Roman Empire in 
AD 476, the following image is painted. The Sassanid dynasty came to be at the same 
time as the Roman Empire was entering a period of serious internal instability. Ardashir 
and his son Shapur I took advantage of this weakness, launching several campaigns 
against the Romans. Though neither side claimed decisive victories during this century, 
the Sassanids inflicted huge losses upon the Roman military, economy, and political 
structure.  
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Conclusion 
 
By the 4th century, after the restoration of stability in the Roman Empire, the same 
antagonistic relationship was in place, but both sides recognized that neither had the 
strength to decisively defeat the other. As a result, intense martial interactions bled over 
into intense diplomatic interactions. This process continued into the 5th century. 
Commercial interactions in border provinces further increased the interplay of both 
Sassanid and Roman nobility and in aggregate this all had an “Orientalizing” effect on 
the Roman world, more will be said about the indicators of this effect later on. Thus in 
times of peace and war, Roman interactions with the Sassanid Empire profoundly altered 
the state of affairs in the Roman world. Courtly officials donned Sassanid style garb as 
they attended Roman emperors who ruled the empire from palaces wearing a royal 
diadem, based on Sassanid designs, clad in the glittering robes of a Sassanid king, and 
hedged about with the pomp and etiquette of an Oriental court.55  
 The following chapters will build upon this skeleton structure of Romano-
Sassanid interactions and delve into causation behind warfare, the expansion of Oriental 
practices in Roman life, and the effect that commercial trade interactions, military 
spending, imperial bureaucratic and courtly costs had on the Roman economy. 
  
  
                                                        
55 M.P. Charlesworth, “The Fear of the Orient in the Roman Empire,” The Cambridge 
Historical Journal 2, no. 1 (1926): 16. 
 24
Chapter 2: The Third Century Crisis and the Rise of the 
Sassanid Empire 
 
Introduction  
 
Following years of bloody and costly warring on the eastern front with the hostile 
and expansionary Sassanid Empire, and his botched attempt to defeat the Germanic 
invaders along the Rhine and Danube, Severus Alexander was assassinated in AD 235.56 
The death of Severus Alexander, the last of the Principate emperors, marked the 
beginning of third century crisis, a period of time in which between 20 and 30 
“legitimate” emperors took the throne.   
This chapter will delve into an extended analysis of this third century crisis and 
attempt to answer the following question: How did the Sassanid Empire contribute to or 
exacerbate the third century crisis? I will argue that the third century was a period of 
intense stress on the framework of the Roman state due, in large measure, to intense 
martial interactions with the Sassanid Empire. In short, the external threat of and conflict 
with the Sassanid Empire, made worse the internal instability of the empire such that this 
political crisis went on for decades not years. In order to make this argument, I will 
discuss the rise of a new type of emperor, “the Barracks Emperor”, the breakdown of the 
territorial structure of the Roman Empire itself, civil war in the Sassanid Empire, and 
finally, reforms of the Roman Empire at the end of the 3rd century.  
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The Barracks Emperors (AD 224–258) 
 
With the death of Alexander Severus came a new string of Sassanid invasions 
beginning in AD 235. Ardashir, at that time, gained control over a number of key Roman 
fortresses in Roman Mesopotamia, among them Nisibis and Carrhae. 57  In AD 240, 
Ardashir managed to capture the city of Hatra, a strategic trading and commercial hub of 
Northern Mesopotamia.58 Following this victory, Ardashir’s son Shapur I took the throne 
and was faced with a Roman counterattack under the emperor Gordian III. As was 
mentioned in the previous chapter, this campaign ended with the destruction of Gordian’s 
army and his death.59 In the wake of this disaster, Philip was declared emperor and forced 
to pay a large indemnity to the Sassanids.   
The loss of face that Philip incurred for paying the indemnity proved to be his 
undoing. Claimants like Decius exploited this weakness. Decius was a Roman 
commander that Philip had appointed to defeat the Goths along the Danube. Instead of 
fighting the Goths, he used the troops assigned to him to rebel, eventually killing emperor 
Philip in battle near modern-day Verona. He, in turn was killed in battle against the Goths 
in AD 251. This episode is indicative of the entire period known as the period of 
“Barracks Emperors”. Gordian III and Decius were both examples of these so-called 
“Barracks Emperors” that ruled with varying degrees of failure from the death of 
Alexander Severus, until the rise of the emperors Valerian and Gallienus in AD 253. 
Barracks Emperors were so called because these were men who seized imperial authority 
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by virtue of their command in the army. These men were typically of the lower classes 
and enjoyed no legitimacy other than that afforded by the legions.  
What makes this period of time so devastating was a combination of two primary 
factors. First, because these barracks emperors were typically men of lower birth who 
rose to prominence as border commanders, their wars of usurpation drew vast numbers of 
troops from the border zones into the interior. It was in these interior regions where many 
of the battles for internal supremacy were fought. This was problematic because there 
were fewer and fewer troops available for border security and to dissuade invasions or 
raids and because the supply of these armies fell to the interior regions while border 
regions suffered devastation from raiding and invasions. Thus, the nature of who was 
fighting for the throne had shifted to low born military commanders whose ambitions 
reduced not only the security, stability, and prosperity of border regions, but interior 
regions as well.60  
Second, an antagonistic Sassanid Empire replaced the relatively passive and 
internally weak Parthian Empire. This presented the Romans with a new and very potent 
enemy in the East at a time when the Roman army was stretched to its limit fighting civil 
wars and counterattacks against the Barbarian tribes along the Rhine and Danube. The 
Sassanids distracted the Roman Emperors from decisively defeating usurpers and 
securing power firmly and allowed the Germanic tribes in the North an extended reprieve 
from Roman interference in local politics. The reign of Ardashir is a good reference point 
for understanding both the antagonistic stance of the Sassanids towards the Romans and 
the effectiveness of the Sassanids at destabilizing the Roman political situation.  
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What was it that motivated this aggressive Sassanid policy towards the Romans in 
the third century? From his ascension to the throne after defeating the forces of the 
Parthian king Artabanus in the battle of Hormizdagan until AD 230, Ardashir set about 
consolidating his position among the former territories of the Parthian Empire. Once this 
task was complete, Ardashir’s focus pivoted outward and he began attempting to secure 
his territories from external threats, the most prominent and immediately dangerous of 
whom, was the Roman Empire. His campaign trajectory supports this notion for instead 
of marching his whole army to raid northern Mesopotamia and advancing into Syria, 
Ardashir laid siege to the strategically important frontier city of Nisibis, while his cavalry 
engaged in quick raids and skirmishes in Syria and Cappadocia.61  
Ardashir’s strategy lends itself to the notion that his motivations for war with 
Rome were strategic and not merely quests for glory. Roman contemporary sources 
contradict this and nominally point to the Sassanid Persian aspirations to “restore and 
reunite the whole empire [the Achaemenid Empire] as it had once been” as casus belli.62 
In arguing this point, Roman authorities were able to perpetuate the line that Ardashir had 
not accomplished his objectives and that what looked like a defeat was actually a Roman 
victory. However, the notion of Ardashir’s war as geopolitical is further reinforced by 
Ardashir’s decision not to press his attack into Syria after defeating a Roman army that 
had formed the right wing of emperor Alexander Severus’s counterattack. With the 
Roman Empire knocked off balance, Ardashir withdrew back to Sassanid lands, content 
with the damage he had done both materially, in term of Roman troops and fortresses, but 
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also strategically. Ardashir helped create a serious succession crisis that perpetuated until 
the end of the third century.  
Breakdown of the Territorial Structure: The Gallic and Palmyrene Empires 
(AD 258–274) 
 
 With the Roman Empire embroiled in internal warfare, a result of the rapid 
succession of Barracks Emperors, Ardashir and his successors kept up their attacks on the 
Eastern frontiers. In AD 260, king Shapur I defeated the emperor Valerian and his army 
at Edessa.63 After this devastating defeat, Shapur went on to occupy cities in Syria, 
Cilicia, and Cappadocia. According several sources, he even occupied the key Roman 
city of Antioch for a time.64 This was a high water mark for the Sassanids against the 
Roman Empire. Not only were Sassanid armies defeating Roman armies, but they were 
also capturing important chokepoints along the Roman-Sassanid frontier. Additionally, 
this marked the genesis for Romano-Sassanid religious interaction, as many Christians 
were absorbed into the Sassanid Empire.  
At first, Shapur I’s rule was marked by the spread of Christianity and relative 
religious tolerance, but the spread of Christianity eroded the power and legitimacy of the 
Zoroastrian priesthood. This led Shapur I to change his religious stance to something 
decidedly more intolerant. The king affirmed imperial links to the Zoroastrian priesthood 
and created anti-Christian laws of intolerance. This phenomenon of intolerance for the 
sake of imperial religious legitimacy was reflected in the caesoropapist policies of the 
Roman state in the fourth and fifth centuries. Sassanid religious developments of this 
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time had profound effects on future Roman internal religious policies as well as on future 
religious conflict with the Sassanids.65  
 Zoroastrianism was an ancient monotheistic Iranian religion that rose to 
prominence in the days of the Achaemenid Persian Empire. The religion posits that there 
are two opposing forces in the world: Spenta Mainyu or “progressive mentality” and 
Angra Mainyu “destructive mentality” all presided over by one god, Ahura Mazda 
“Illuminating Wisdom”. 66  Ardashir and his successors did their best to coopt 
Zoroastrianism as a tool of legitimacy. For example, in a ceremonial rock carving at 
Naqsh-i-Rustam, Ardashir is portrayed on horseback standing on top of the dead body of 
Artabanus. Ahura Mazda mirrors Ardashir as he, also on horseback, is lording over the 
body of the evil spirit, Ahreman, and handing the king the symbol of sovereignty.67 This 
stylized representation of Ardashir’s victory over Artabanus indicates both the primacy of 
Ahura Mazda and by extension Zoroastrianism in the Sassanid Empire and its use as a 
tool of Sassanid imperial legitimacy.   
Valerian’s capture by the Sassanids during his campaign in AD 260 created a 
central power vacuum that allowed for portions of the Roman Empire to begin breaking 
away. For example, Septimius Odaenathus, a dynast of Palmyra, carved out a large 
portion of the Eastern provinces as part of a “Palmyrene Empire”. 68  Ironically, 
Odaenathus may be responsible for halting the Sassanid threat, at least temporarily. After 
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his defeat of Valerian, Shapur I attempted to advance into Anatolia but was pushed back 
by a combination of local Roman defense forces and attacks by Odaenathus.69  
Likewise, the Gallic Empire, created by Postumus in AD 260 was created as a 
result of that same central power vacuum. The Gallic Empire was, in many ways, still a 
“Roman Empire” in that it had its own praetorian guard, consuls elected each year, and 
most likely an independent senate.70 These breakaway empires reflected more so the need 
for immediate local security, rather than a shift from the Roman Empire to a series of 
successor states. More specifically, the Gallic Empire’s case foreshadows the response of 
Gallic local elites to protracted macro-level instability in the Roman world in the fifth 
century.   
The political situation of the Roman Empire was most dire at this point. 
Fortunately, a new string of tough emperors took power such as Claudius II Gothicus 
who managed to defeat a Gothic invasion in 269 as well as recover Hispania from the 
Gallic Empire. His successor, Aurelian continued in his footsteps defeating invasions by 
the Visigoths, the Vandals and the Sassanids. This period was characterized by a 
sequence of desperately needed victories, without which, the Roman Empire may not 
have survived. Claudius and Aurelian both represented a second wind of Roman imperial 
leadership and by AD 274 the Roman Empire had been reunited into a single political 
entity. But what was the result of this period of political instability? 
Having stepped back from the proverbial abyss, the Roman Empire was severely 
wounded. Protracted internal warfare as well as long periods of border and interior raids 
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by both the Northern tribes as well as the Sassanids left Rome’s economy in a terrible 
state. Once-prosperous cities were destroyed, their populations dispersed, and whole 
areas of agricultural production laid waste. Examples of the extent of this devastation 
were the sackings of Nisibis and Antioch c. AD 238 and c. 253 respectively by Shapur 
I.71 Though both cities were regained, there sackings stripped them of capital and thus the 
Romans were forced to rebuild both a major trade hub (Nisibis) and a major military 
staging area (Antioch). The Roman authorities did not have the revenue adequate for 
these and other rebuilding projects, which led to hyperinflation. Inflation had always been 
an issue of the Roman Empire as no form of public debt issuance existed for meeting 
expense obligations. However, this inflationary tendency rapidly accelerated in the 3rd 
century. From the time of Augustus to Gordian III the weight of a silver denarius had 
dropped from 3.64 to 2.1 grams with silver content itself dropping from 3.52 to 1.0 
gram.72 By AD 268 there was only 0.5 percent sliver in the denarius, leading to its 
discontinuation as a reliable medium of exchange.  
The annual pay of a legionary soldier in denarii can also provide a metric for 
understanding the level of coinage debasement. At the beginning of the 3rd century under 
the rule of Septimius Severus annual legionary pay was somewhere between 400 and 600 
denarii, source evidence is unclear as to the exact amount. By the reign of Maximius 
Thrax in the mid 230s, this annual sum had increased to between 1,200 and 1,800 denarii. 
By the reign of Diocletian at the end of the 3rd century, annual legionary pay had reached 
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between 7,500 and almost 12,400. 73  Not only had the pay of an individual soldier 
increased 20 times over, but the reported number of legions had also increased in that 
same period from 33 to 68 legions with an estimated increase of annual burdens for the 
legions increasing from 61,400,000 denarii to 419,850,000 denarii. 74  In short, the 
burdens of the state, specifically the costs of the army in this case, ballooned in the third 
century as a result of internal strife, barbarian incursions, and warfare with the Sassanids.  
 The erosion of the Roman imperial coin economy, coupled with the dangers of 
travel, disrupted much of Rome’s internal trade network. Travel became hazardous 
during this time as a result of increased banditry and raiding from barbarians and internal 
usurpers. This led to increased localism and a resultant decline of taxes, duties, and 
customs levied by the Roman imperial authority. This local level instability also led to 
the rise of small walled cities typical of the Medieval Ages. Archaeological evidence 
suggests that there was a departure from the sprawling, open, proto-industrial cities of 
early antiquity.75 Though the direct cause of the decline of domestic trade was local level 
instability, warfare with the Sassanids was a contributory factor. The stripping of border 
region garrisons to fill the deplete ranks of Rome’s Eastern legions left power vacuums in 
many Roman provinces. Without military security movement around the empire slowed 
to a crawl. 
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The deleterious effect of protracted political instability of the third century fell 
hardest on the western portion of the Roman Empire. Because warfare between the 
Romans and the Sassanids was localized to the Mesopotamian and Armenia frontiers, 
with some cases of Sassanid armies penetrating farther into Roman lands, much of the 
East was spared the devastations of foreign incursions. This allowed the East to maintain 
a high level of urbanization as well as to preserve a good portion of its agricultural base. 
Meanwhile, the absence of adequate frontier garrisons in the West, as a result of revolts 
by generals and a shifting of soldiers to the East, left the western provinces hopelessly 
exposed and vulnerable to raiding. The Sassanids were a direct military threat to the East 
and Roman responses to this threat had exacerbating effects on the existing problems of 
the West.   
Civil War in the Sassanid Empire: A Decade of Roman Reunification (AD 
274-284) 
 
As was mentioned previously in this chapter, the Palyrene Empire broke away 
from the Roman Empire as a result of internal weakness and the pressing need for local 
security. The breakaway Palmyrene Empire had, ironically, proved to be a godsend as it 
provided a key buffer zone between the Romans and the Sassanids until the assassination 
of its emperor, Odaenathus in AD 267. 76  After Odaenathus’s death, the Palmyrene 
Empire was thrown into a period of confusion, which allowed the emperor Aurelian to 
march East unopposed until he reached Antioch. Once there, the emperor won victories at 
Daphne and Emesa. 77  Palmyra fell within the year and Aurelian then turned west 
reconquering the Gallic Empire.   
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By the time the Roman Empire had been reunited, the Sassanid Empire was 
showing signs of weakness. Bahram II’s reign from AD 274-293 was marked by 
considerable internal weakness, and against this backdrop, the peace of AD 299 can be 
understood. The Roman emperor Carus, in AD 282, invaded the Sassanid Empire and had 
remarkable success. He drove deep into Mesopotamia and occupied the Sassanid capital 
Ctesiphon. Carus’s death put an end to this advance and the Romans retreated, leaving 
the Sassanids to reconquer Mesopotamia.78 This decade proved to be a key moment in the 
third century as Sassanid weakness allowed the Romans to reassert dominance in the East 
and set the stage for Diocletian’s rebuilding of the empire. 
Diocletian and the Reformation of the Roman Empire: (AD 284–305) 
 
This was the Roman Empire that Diocletian inherited upon taking the throne in 
AD 284, a land still burning with the fire of Barbarian raids and Sassanid campaigns and 
rife with potential usurpers. Finally, however, the pendulum had swung in the Romans’ 
favor, as the Sassanids faced their own bout of internal dissent. Diocletian’s recipe for 
successful reformation of the Roman Empire stood on three legs. First, Diocletian 
established a tetrarchical system of rule whereby four emperors would be in place, each 
having responsibility for a quarter of the empire. This system built on the advantages of 
such a system that developed organically with the Gallic and Palmyrene Empires. 
Smaller governed units gave the Roman Empire the ability to respond to multiple threats, 
an attribute that had been lacking under the old Principate system. Also, this division of 
imperial responsibilities left the emperorship more robust.  
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The drawback was that this created a multitude of new positions in the imperial 
court and bureaucracy, placing a greater strain on the Roman economy. Alongside the 
vast expansion of military spending of Diocletian, as indicated in our discussion of 
military expenditure figures earlier in this chapter, this led to a fourfold increase in state 
expenditures on imperial courts. Thus administrative reform came at the cost of 
antagonistic centralization and a vast expansion of the empire’s civil and martial arms, 
increasing the expenses of the state. 
Second, Diocletian campaigned successfully against the Sassanids in the 280s and 
even sacked Ctesiphon in AD 299.79 This was important because the resultant peace 
treaty that Diocletian signed with the Sassanids became a robust peace that lasted until 
the mid 330s. Even though Diocletian had won a resounding victory over the Sassanids, 
he imposed moderate concessions on the Sassanid king. The principle points of the treaty 
were as follows: the Romans gained control over Intelene, Sophene, Arzanene, Cordyene, 
and Zabdicene, the Tigris marked the boundary between the Romans and Sassanids, the 
fortress of Zintha marked the edge of Armenian territory, and Nisibis became the only 
city for commercial transactions between the Sassanids and Romans. The concessions 
imposed on the Sassanids under this treaty were not exorbitant and as a result the 
Sassanids were not predisposed to break the treaty. Diocletian, with his eastern border 
finally secured was able to go about consolidating his domestic position and reassert 
dominance over key Germanic tribes and confederations. This ended the long period of 
Sassanid dominance along the Eastern frontier.  
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Third, Diocletian created a string of new economic policies such as the imposition 
of requisitions in kind as opposed to taxes paid in coin. In order to accurately determine 
these requisition rates, Diocletian also went about an extensive census of the empire 
assessing the value of labor and land of each landowner, creating economic units of 
capita and iuga.80 He also created a new coinage system that relied on five coins: the 
solidus (gold coin), the argenteus (silver), the follis (copper with silver), the radiates 
(copper) and laureatus B (copper).81 In order to protect the vital functions of the state 
Diocletian also created hereditary professions. Peasants were tied to the land, while 
soldiers’ children were forced into military service.82 
 While stability was finally regained under Diocletian, the cost proved tremendous. 
From a martial perspective, the rise of the Sassanid threat was followed by an 
unprecedented expansion of Rome’s eastern military presence. Operating under an 
assumption that the late 2nd century ratio of legionary to auxiliary infantry [1:1] held firm 
in the early 3rd century, then the on paper size of legionary forces in the East would have 
numbered roughly 65,000 legionaries, 65,000 auxiliary infantry, and several units of 
cavalry and other support troops whose total would have been in the 10,000s. All told, 
this would have constituted about a third of overall combat effective troops of the Roman 
Empire, somewhere between 150,000 and 175,000 troops total. This third of the Roman 
Army was deployed to a relative small area, the Mesopotamian frontier. This left the 
remainder of Rome’s troops to be spread over the rest of the Roman Empire. 
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 Given the unequal distribution of troops across the empire, the Western provinces 
were contributing massive amounts of local wealth for upkeep, but were reaping little of 
the benefits of a larger military. These were the provinces that, arguably, suffered the 
most from the third century crisis. They faced external threats from barbarian tribes as 
well as internal seizures and requisitions of in-kind provisions and manpower by 
usurpers. Thus, the third century marked a stark delineation of fortunes for different 
Roman regions. The Roman East, ironically due to the presence of the Sassanid threat 
along its borders, reaped the benefits of military expansion and the nature of frontier 
warfare in the east left vast areas of the east untouched by war and still economically 
potent. The western provinces, by contrast, were devastated by external invasion and 
internal dissent.  
 Also under the rule of Diocletian, the nature of the Roman court began to change. 
In order to bring the disparate elements of the Roman imperial government under tighter 
control, Diocletian adopted a number of changes to the imperial court that created a 
“patrimonial” palace-based bureaucracy. 83  In doing so, Diocletian created a system 
whereby the imperial court was the “clearing house” for imperial decision-making. 
Unfortunately, Diocletian could not be part and parcel to all decisions and this meant a 
reliance on a rigid caste system of jockeying subordinates who advised the emperor with 
varying degrees of trustworthiness: 
 Four of five men gather and form a plan to deceive the emperor, then tell him what he 
must approve. The emperor, who is shut up in his palace, cannot know the truth. He is 
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forced to know only what these men tell him; he appoints judges who ought not to be 
appointed, and removes from public office men whom he ought to keep in office.
84 
 
This system bears a striking resemblance to the Sassanid court system. In the Sassanid 
system those men of high status politically, economically, or religiously played advisory 
roles to the Sassanid kings and were relied on to carry out his orders. One marker of 
strong kings of the Sassanid Empire was his ability to circumvent entrenched nobles with 
new men and outsiders such as eunuchs.85  Diocletian followed the Sassanid lead by 
incorporating eunuchs into the imperial court system, relying on them primarily to hold 
two key positions, cubicularii; chamberlain, and praepositus sacricubiculi; the grand 
chamberlain.86 
Conclusion 
 
What changed at the onset of the third century crisis was the rise of Ardashir and 
the Sassanid dynasty out of the ashes of the Parthian Empire. Ardashir’s rise to power 
marked the end of almost a century of severe Parthian internal weakness brought on by 
none other than the Romans themselves.87 The Sassanids, within the space of a few years, 
became the predominant enemy of the Roman Empire, and a frontier that had been 
important but never herculean to defend, became a serious battleground for a conflict that 
lasted, almost without interruption, from AD 226 to AD 299. The case of Alexander 
Severus’s campaign indicates that this new threat shocked the Roman system and 
stretched traditional equilibriums to the breaking point. Thus the rise of Sassanid Empire 
was a necessary cause for the onset of the Third Century Crisis and a contributory cause 
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to the decades of turmoil that followed. In order to respond to this threat as well as 
internal revolt and barbarian incursions, the Roman state was forced to vastly increase its 
military spending, all the while relying on a tax base that was shrinking further and 
further with each year of instability. A string of “Barracks Emperors”, who came to 
power at the expense of border security, one by one proved incapable of balancing 
imperial attention to internal threats with the external threat of the barbarians and the 
Sassanids. With the failure of each of these emperors, a little bit of the old Principate 
system was washed away. The break up of the Roman state in the 260s accelerated the 
erosion of this old Principate system.  
By the rule of Diocletian, the Roman Empire was a vastly different place. 
Increased centralization, the proliferation of a companion field army attached to the 
person of the emperor, and the rising rigidity of Roman society were all markers of this 
change. Furthermore, Diocletian appears to have been adapting Sassanid court practices 
such as the use of court eunuchs and creating a palace based patrimonial governmental 
structure. In doing so, Diocletian replaced the Principate with the Dominate. There is 
evidence of several other areas of Roman adaptation of better Sassanid practices. For 
example, one can see these changes in the senatorial records of Alexander Severus’s 
campaign against the Sassanids. The record stated “[the Romans] killed 10,000 mailed 
horsemen, whom they call Clibanarians, in battle and equipped [their] men with their 
armor”.88 The Romans not only recognized the military power of such troops but they 
also took steps to arm themselves in similar fashion. More than anything, when looking 
back at the Diocletian’s reign, internal revolt was still an imminent threat, the barbarians 
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of the Rhine and Danube frontier were still threatening, but one piece of the puzzle had 
fallen into place, Roman supremacy in the East. The weakness of the Sassanid Empire in 
the last couple of decades of the third century, it would appear, provided Diocletian the 
breathing room he needed to reassert imperial control and promote stability.  
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Chapter 3: Romano-Sassanid 4
th
 Century Relations and 
Tensions 
 
Introduction 
 
 As we ended the previous chapter, the Roman Emperor Diocletian was attempting 
to put the pieces of the Roman Empire back together. As his eastern policy indicated, 
Diocletian understood the need to stabilize the frontier with the Sassanids and forge a 
robust and lasting peace. Instead of imposing an embarrassing and potentially 
destabilizing peace treaty upon the Sassanids, Diocletian sent a high official, Sicoirus 
Probus, as ambassador to negotiate a balanced treaty. The result was a modest peace, one 
devoid of serious secessions of territories or payment of indemnity.89 This was a result of 
Diocletian’s policy in the East: to not overexert the capacities of the empire, to refrain 
from expansion, and to be content with a restoration of the borders that had been fixed by 
the Eastern policy of the Severi.90  
 With the signing of this treaty came a new face in the 4th century of Romano-
Sassanid relations. It was no longer characterized by unceasing warfare, but rather by 
long stretches of amicable peace punctuated by shorter periods of conflict. A dynamic 
change occurred where the Sassanids and Romans began to interact in societal spheres 
beyond warfare. This military and non-military interplay between the Romans and the 
Sassanids in the 4th century will be the focus of this chapter. In doing so, I will attempt to 
answer a two part question: what were some of the non-military changes to the Roman 
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Empire brought on by the Sassanid Empire in the 4th century and, more importantly, how 
did those changes contribute to the fall of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth 
century?  
Constantine’s Reforms: Civil War, Roman Court Life, and State Religion 
(AD 312-338) 
 
 In AD 305 Diocletian and his co-emperor, Maximian, abdicated and were 
succeeded by the emperors Constantius and Galerius. Unfortunately, after a year, 
Constantius died and his son Constantine I was proclaimed emperor. This prompted 
another period of civil war that only ended in AD 316 after Constantine had dispatched 
all remaining Augusti and Caesars. Part of this civil war included a battle between 
Constantine and Maxentius at the Milvian Bridge in AD 312. The popular narrative has it 
that Constantine saw a vision of the Chi-Rho the evening before the battle. Our 
contemporary source of the battle, Eusebius, describes the event, saying that Constantine 
looked up and saw a cross of light along with the Greek words Εν Τούτῳ Νίκα. The 
literal meaning of which is “In this sign, [you shall] conquer”. Eusebius’s account has 
long faced criticism for romanticizing Constantine’s conversion to Christianity. 91  
Whether the event happened or not, the Chi-Rho began to appear on coins c. AD 317, 
which indicates that Constantine had adopted a new imperial symbol, one of Christian 
origin. He went further in bringing Christianity to the empire; he converted to 
Christianity and, in his 313 Edict of Milan, gave Christians and other religious groups the 
right to open and free observance and practice of their worship.92  
                                                        
91 Raymond Van Dam, Remembering Constantine at the Milvian Bridge (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 41. 
92 Lactantius “Edict of Milan” in De Mortibus Persecutorum, translated by Dana Munro 
(Philadelphia: Routledge, 1898), 29-30. 
 43
It is easy in retrospect to consider this the pivotal moment in Roman imperial 
adaptation of Christianity as a state orthodoxy but the reality is slightly more 
complicated. Constantine appears to have included the legend of Sol Invictus in coinage 
as well as the statuettes of standard bearers in the reliefs of the Arch of Constantine.93 
Taken in conjunction with coinage that appeared at the same time with images of the Chi-
Rho, it can be inferred that Constantine relied on a number of deities during his reign for 
legitimacy. This makes sense when considering that Constantine did not convert to 
Christianity until his death.94 Therefore, the Roman Empire had not become Christian as 
of yet, but had taking its first tentative steps in that direction. It seems strange that the 
Sassanids did not capitalize upon this period of civil war in the Roman Empire to reassert 
themselves on the Eastern frontier. 
 After the successes of Aurelian, Carus, and Diocletian (along with his son 
Galerius), the Sassanid Empire underwent a few decades of serious internal turmoil. 
Several kings came and went after the peace of AD 299 and it was only in AD 337, 
almost forty years after the peace made with Diocletian that a strong king took the throne 
and provoked war with the Romans, Shapur II.95 This period of four decades can thus be 
seen as an important reprieve for the Roman state to rebuild its institutions and regain 
some internal cohesion.   
 One of the largest reforms of Constantine during this period was the creation of a 
new capital Constantinople. This was a serious political maneuver as Constantine’s 
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relocation of imperial power farther East had two profound effects. First, Constantine 
managed to cut off the old Roman aristocracy from the locus of power and in doing so he 
centered the whole process of imperial appointments on the person of the emperor.96 
Second, he shifted the whole focus of imperial power much farther East, which had the 
effect of distancing the Western portion of the Empire from influence and patronage. It 
was the Eastern portion of the empire that benefitted from this change. The whole move 
is best summed up in the words of Eusebius: 
The commanders of the whole army, the comites, and all the ruling class, who were 
bound by law to pay homage to the emperor first, filed past at the required times and 
saluted the emperor on the bier (platform) with genuflections after his death in the same 
way as when he was alive. After these chief persons the members of the Senate and all 
those of official rank came and did the same, and after them crowds of people of all ranks 
with their wives and children came to look.
97 
 
Under Constantine intricate rules for promotion developed and formally 
designated sub-units proliferated, such as the "Sacred Wardrobe" (scrinium sacrae 
vestis), the palace "Lamplighters" (lampadarii), the "Commissars" (mensores) 
responsible for supplying and billeting the court on its journeys away from the palace, 
and the scrinium dispositionum, a unit dedicated to the creating time tables of the ruler's 
daily business.98 Constantine also enacted imperial patronage for the building of key 
churches across the empire and granted bishops and some priests exemptions from 
undertaking magistracies and other expensive services for their local community.99 In 
summation Constantine: pushed through reforms that elevated the position of emperor to 
a deeply venerated status, created a rigid administrative and bureaucratic structure, and 
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began a process of linking the Christian church with the Roman state. While these 
reforms may appear sudden and revolutionary, many of them were continuations of 
policies of past emperors. For example, Diocletian was the emperor who first began 
establishing the emperor as a venerated individual secluded from the general population. 
One decided break that Constantine made with Diocletian’s succession policies was that 
he firmly placed all rights of inheritance in the hands of members of the Constantine 
dynasty and royal household. These steps taken by Constantine put the Roman Empire 
along a new path of totalitarianism and social rigidity that is reminiscent of its Eastern 
neighbor, the Sassanid Empire.  
The Sassanids had also developed a rigid caste system divided into four classes: 
atorbanan (priests), arteshtaran (warriors), dabiran (secretaries), and vasteryoshan-
hootkheshan (commoners).100 Membership in a class was based on birth, however, some 
exceptionally talented individuals could move up to a higher social stratum. It should be 
noted that the top three strata of this society were professionalized classes, in the employ 
of the state.  Like the Roman Empire, the Sassanid state was religiously diverse and a 
variety of religions could be found within its borders: Judaism, Christianity, 
Manichaeism, Mazdakism, and others. Zoroastrianism was far and away the religion with 
the largest number of adherents and the greatest legitimacy in Sassanid society. Some 
scholars have long argued that Zoroastrianism was a state religion while others argued 
that, although all kings recognized and honored Ahura-Mazda, and Iran was 
“zoroasterianized” through Sassanid royal patronage, it was never a state religion. Given 
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the prominent position that the Zoroastrian priestly class held in society and the salience 
of fire construction during most periods, it can be concluded that Zoroastrianism had its 
ebbs and flows in importance.101 At times it was state orthodoxy, at others, a rallying 
banner of revolt.  Evidence of Sassanid royal support for Zoroastrianism and the 
Zoroastrian priestly class can be seen in the rights and privileges given to the Zoroastrian 
priestly class and royal patronage of many religious sites, new temples, and other 
religious architecture.102 The Sassanid court also featured a pre-eminence of the royal 
family, and extensive genealogical surveys in contemporary sources of family members 
indicate the importance of lineage for members of the royal court.103  
After the emperors of the Roman Empire became more and more intertwined with 
the Christian Church, a new point of friction appeared between the Romans and 
Sassanids. Religion became a new casus belli for both powers and this led to, among 
other reasons, a renewal of conflict between them. This renewed period of conflict would 
be characterized by many of the themes of previous wars but one new addition was 
religion as a cause for war.  
The Mid 4
th
 Century: Renewed Hostilities (AD 338-364) 
 
 Hostilities eventually broke out again in AD 336 after border incursions into 
Armenia by prince Narseh, Shapur II’s son. As Armenia had been a Christian kingdom 
since AD 301, religious motivations might have played a role in the war. This notion is 
reinforced by our source Eusebius, who wrote that Constantine had sent a letter to Shapur 
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II asserting his patronage over the Christian subjects of the Sassanid Empire. 104 
Constantine never managed to launch his campaign against the Sassanids as he died in 
AD 337.105  
According to Festus, war began in earnest during the reign of Constantine II, who 
fought against the Sassanids with varying and indecisive outcomes. The two powers 
fought nine battles. Festus mentions that the Romans were victorious at the battles of 
Narasara, Singara and the first battle of Sisara. The second battle of Sisara was a Roman 
defeat.106 Festus also goes into some detail about important sieges such as the siege, and 
eventual loss, of Amida and the three sieges of Nisibis. Festus’s account reveals several 
important themes of warfare between the Romans and the Sassanids at this time. First, 
there were quite a large number of battles. Second, the mix of successes and failures 
indicate that the war was very indecisive. Third, the main focuses of sieges were 
economically and strategically important trade cities in Northern Mesopotamia.107 Thus, 
religious motivations could have played one role in the cause for warfare in conjunction 
with trade concerns. 
Trade had always been an important consideration between the Roman and 
Sassanid Empires. As part of the peace accords of AD 299, trade between the Roman and 
Sassanid Empires was reserved to one city, Nisibis. In limiting trade to a Roman 
occupied city, the Romans were able to collect transaction and customs duties while the 
Sassanid merchants were forced to pay 25% as opposed to the traditional 12.5% duty of 
                                                        
104 Eusebius, Vita Constantini, 4.9.f.  
105 Garth Fowden, “The Last Days of Constantine: Oppositional Versions and Their 
Influence,” The Journal of Roman Studies 84, no. 1 (1994): 146-48.   
106 Festus Breviarium rerum gestarum populi Romani, translated by Jennifer A. Meka 
(Buffalo: Canisius College, 2001), XXVII. 
107 Dignas & Winter, Rome and Persia, 89.  
 48
the selling price.108 Against this backdrop of trade competition, the three sieges of Nisibis 
are quite understandable. Thus, war with the Sassanids had both commercial and 
religious elements. 
 Constantius II managed to grind the Sassanids into a stalemate, but not without 
substantial losses. He also managed to defeat an Alamanni army that invaded at the same 
time. Unfortunately, he was not able to successfully deal with internal rivalries as 
indicated by his death at the hands of Constans at Aquileia in AD 340. Civil war 
proliferated across the empire as members of the house of Constantine vied for power. 
Constans and Constantius managed to defeat the Sassanids at the Siege of Singara in AD 
348 and subdue revolts of Christian heretics, the Donatists, in Africa, but were unable to 
stop Magnentius from usurping the throne in the west. Magnetius killed Constans but 
later died by his own hand after his defeat at the battle of Mons Seleucia in AD 353.  
 By the 360s the Sassanids firmly held the upper hand over the Romans. They had 
pushed the Roman frontier further up into Northern Mesopotamia and contested the client 
state status of Armenia. Shapur II apparently took this moment to solidify his gains and 
proposed a peace.109 Instead of accepting a peace treaty, the emperor Julian (AD 361-
363) embarked on his own campaign against the Sassanids. Ammianus Marcellinus 
posited that Julian was embarking upon the expedition as revenge for Sassanid aggression 
in the years before his ascension to the throne. 110  Libanius likewise stated that the 
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campaign was meant to punish the Sassanids for recent aggression. 111  These two 
attestations lend weight to this argument and also basic pragmatism would make such a 
campaign understandable. As Julian had only recently come to power, he required a 
mode of justifying his rule. He had made a name for himself as a military commander, as 
indicated by his victory at the Battle of Strasbourg attested by Ammianus, therefore war 
with the Sassanids was an rational choice. It was even more appealing because Julian’s 
acceptance of unfavorable terms of peace with Shapur II could have had destabilizing and 
delegitimizing effects on his rule.  
While his motives were understandable, the tactics and strategy of Julian during 
the campaign proved to be his undoing. Instead of meeting the Sassanids in the field, 
Julian embarked on an invasion into the heart of Mesopotamia to capture Ctesiphon.112 
The campaign was, in short, a disaster. While the Romans enjoyed early successes, 
Julian’s tactical miscalculations, for example he burned his fleet of supply ships as a 
“tactical necessity” instead of leaving them afloat for supply and transport purposes, led 
to a precarious position where the Roman army was cornered in its camp and running low 
on supplies.113 Julian was mortally wounded and his successor Jovian was forced, for the 
sake of his life and the lives of the men of the army, to sign an embarrassing peace treaty 
that ceded much territory to the Sassanids and forced the Romans to pay a large 
indemnity.114 This treaty proved to be Jovian’s undoing as he was overthrown and killed 
in AD 364 only a year after ascending to power. 
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Late Fourth Century Developments: Diplomacy and Trade, The Battle of 
Adrianople, and Division of the Empire (AD 364-395) 
 
As part of the peace treaty that was signed between Jovian and Shapur II, the Romans 
ceded all territory East of the Tigris including the important trade cities Singara and 
Nisibis. Trade, as was mentioned earlier, was an important consideration for the Romans 
when approaching eastern policy. A contemporary description of the Sassanids will 
indicate why such trade considerations were important: 
...[the Persians] are said to have everything in abundance, for the nations neighbouring 
their territory are given the opportunity to engage in trade and therefore they themselves 
also seem to have plenty of everything.
115
 
 
Nisibis was, after the deaths of Julian and Jovian, still the only city of commercial 
exchange, but after the peace treaty with Jovian, it fell under Sassanid control.116117 
Ammianus Marcellinus provides an account of the exodus of Roman subjects from the 
city and how its capture by the Sassanid sent shock waves through the empire.118 Thus 
victory in war for the Sassanids meant a recapturing of a more favorable trade position 
with the Romans. 
 These frequent wars, be they for trade, religious concerns, or merely prestige, 
were draining on the Roman economy, as they had been in the 3rd century. With the loss 
of favorable trade relations with the Sassanids, the Roman vehicle for taxation was called 
on, in the fourth just as the third century, to squeeze more revenue from the average 
taxpayer.119 This view is central to the prevailing high taxation model but I will not argue 
that taxes rose continuously. Rather, I argue that the gap between the potential surplus of 
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the average tax payer and the collection of that surplus as tax revenue closed over a 
period of time to the point where the Roman state could not feasibly squeeze any more 
revenue out of the lower classes. The loss of customs and duties levied from merchants in 
the East also proved to be a contributory cause to the empire’s late 4th century financial 
troubles. 
 Just as it was unfeasible to extract more taxes from the lower classes, so too it was 
politically unfeasible to raise taxes for the privileged economic elites. Though they held 
the largest surplus of potential revenue, these privileged economic elites coincided 
sharply with the privileged political elites as well. No emperor could therefore conceive 
of squeezing the elites for fear of revolt. 120  Unfortunately, heavy taxation on the 
commoners had the effect of forcing lower class members to tie themselves to local elites 
who could provide them with day-to-day border security from outside incursions and tax 
collectors. Proto-feudalistic civil society began to develop as a result of this, particularly 
in the Western provinces that were more rural, exposed to barbarian raids, and poorer 
than the urbanized provinces of the East.  
 Trying to balance taxation was just one high wire act among many that the Roman 
emperors were forced to address. Valens, in AD 378, unfortunately fell dramatically from 
the wire, figuratively plummeting to his death during the Battle of Adrianople. While 
Valens was marshaling his forces at Antioch to mount a campaign against the Sassanids, 
a group of Goths entered Roman territory under a white flag. These Goths were 
attempting to escape the onslaught of Hunnic expansionism and beseeched the Roman 
court for land on which to settle. This could not have come at a worse time, as Valens 
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was attempting to expel Sassanid forces from Armenia and reinstall the favored Roman 
candidate for the kingship of Armenia, Papas.121 Armenia represented both a religious 
and strategic issue for the Romans. Not only was the imposition of a non-Christian ruing 
part over Armenia a blow to Roman imperial legitimacy as the defenders of all 
Christians, as indicated by the letter between Constantine and Shapur II, but also it left 
the fortresses of the Mesopotamian frontier exposed.122 Because Valens did not have the 
men and material ready in the Balkans to fight the Goths and because he saw an 
opportunity to obtain some hardy troops and revenue from a taxable Gothic farming 
population in the Balkans, he arranged for them to stay within the empire.123 Sources are 
scant regarding the series of events that led to the revolt of the Goths, but it seems that 
either through mismanagement or corruption supplies were not sent in adequate amounts 
to placate the Goths who in turn began devastating the provinces along the Danube.  
 Valens was forced to return westward, hastily gathering up men to counter this 
threat. Much like in the past, even when war was not actively being waged between the 
Romans and Sassanids, the Sassanids preoccupied the Roman emperors, such that they 
were left vulnerable to other threats. Valens was forced to react quickly to the Gothic 
advances but, either through his own mismanagement of his forces or undisciplined 
actions taken by those under his command, Valens’s army was destroyed, with only 
about a third of the original 60,000 managing to escape. Valens himself is said to have 
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died in the flames of a cottage fire.124 Valens also failed to wait for the supporting troops 
of the Western emperor Gratian, whose army was positioned close by in Sirmium.125 
Whether this was a strategic move on Valens’ part to move quickly and assault the 
Gothic army before reinforcements arrived or a tactic born of hubris is still hotly debated. 
 The Battle of Adrianople resulted in the destruction of the core of the Eastern 
Roman Army and another period of internal contest for the throne. The next couple 
decades were dominated by this internal warfare, all the while, the barbarians began 
making inroads into the western half of the empire while the eastern half of the Roman 
Empire was preoccupied with countering Sassanid threats and rebuilding her army. 
Theodosius I finally put an end to this period of unrest by deposing Arbogast and 
Eugenius, briefly reuniting the Roman Empire under one emperor.  
Conclusion 
  
 The Roman Empire, much like in the third century, had to balance operations 
against the Sassanids with domestic stability and barbarian threats. Furthermore, 
economic concerns were still omnipresent as the empire was faced with mounting 
expenses and an eroding tax base. Several elements of the 4th-century Romano-Sassanid 
relations and tension were very different from those encountered in the preceding eras. 
 War with the Sassanids was not one sided. Often these wars were costly and 
indecisive with one side or the other gaining moderate concessions after much bloodshed. 
As a result, considerable diplomatic interaction occurred between the Sassanids and the 
Romans in order to smooth over issues. This, in turn, bled into increased levels of trade 
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between the two powers as the Empire’s financial resources were spent on the military 
and administrative functions as well as luxury goods for the imperial court and top 
economic players. This diplomatic and economic interplay led to a diffusion of beliefs 
and customs that altered the landscape of Roman high court life.  Edward Gibbon best 
summarizes this change in court life, and by extension, popular Roman culture: 
The simplicity of Roman manners was [now] insensibly corrupted by the stately 
affectation of the courts of Asia. The distinctions of personal merit and influence, so 
conspicuous in a republic, so feeble and obscure under a monarchy, were abolished by 
the despotism of the emperors; who substituted in their room a severe subordination of 
rank and office, from the titled slaves, who were seated on the steps of the throne, to the 
meanest instruments of arbitrary power.126 
  
  With the death of Theodosius I in AD 395, the Roman Empire was formally 
divided into the West, under the rule of Honorius and the East under Arcadius. Given 
what we know about the last few decades of the fourth-century Roman Empire it would 
appear that the Eastern and not the Western Empire was in most dire peril. The purpose 
of the concluding chapter of this thesis will be to answer the following question: why did 
the Western and not the Eastern Roman Empire fall? In order to answer this question, the 
concluding chapter of this thesis will incorporate what we have learned from 3rd and 4th 
century Romano-Sassanid interactions as well as other causal forces such as internal 
revolt, court intrigue, and barbarian invasions to construct a causal framework for 
understanding the puzzle. 
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Conclusion: Court Intrigue, Barbarians, and the Fall of an 
Empire 
 
Introduction 
 
 We left off the previous chapter with the observation that the Eastern Roman 
Empire, at least superficially, was in worse shape than the Western Roman Empire. It 
was the Eastern not the Western Roman Empire that lost the core of its army at the battle 
of Adrianople, was without an emperor, and was facing threats from the Goths along the 
Danube and the Sassanids in Armenia and Mesopotamia. Yet by AD 476 it was the 
Western not Eastern Roman Empire that ceased to exist as a political unit.  
In this concluding chapter, I will ask the question: why did the Western and not 
the Eastern Roman Empire fall? To answer this question I will discuss the early-fifth 
century period of recovery by the Eastern Roman Empire in the wake of the formal 
divide of East and West, as well as Western attempts to respond to the string of barbarian 
incursions that occurred at the time. Following this discussion, I will describe the 
attempts by the Eastern Roman Empire to shore up the defenses and imperial strength of 
the sickly Western Roman Empire. Finally, I will conclude with a quick overview of the 
almost three centuries of Romano-Sassanid interactions and create an overarching 
narrative of Sassanid contributions to the fall of the Western Roman Empire.  
Rebuilding the Eastern Army, Stabilizing the Frontier, and Combating 
Paganism: The Rule of Theodosius I (AD 379-395) 
 
In the wake of the battle of Adrianople, the Eastern Roman Empire was without 
an emperor and this put the Western Roman Emperor, 19-year-old Gratian, in a very 
precarious position. In order to stabilize the East, Gratian appointed Theodosius I the 
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commander of the Illyrian legions. As Valens did not have a successor, this amounted to 
an invitation for Theodosius I to become Gratian’s co-emperor.127  This appointment 
proved to be a success as Theodosius campaigned successfully against Fritigurn and the 
Gothic army from Adrianople. In order to defeat the Gothic army, Theodosius was forced 
to rebuild the eastern army. 
Through extensive conscription levies, recruitment drives, and draconian draft 
dodging laws, Theodosius managed to raised a substantial number of troops. One direct 
attack on the Goths that Theodosius attempted is evidence enough of the folly of a direct 
assault strategy as the Roman column was badly defeated and Theodosius was, himself, 
badly wounded. 128  Instead small-scale skirmishes and ambushes whittled down the 
Gothic forces and eventually the Goths were defeated. Theodosius I managed to check 
off the first item on the list of imperial mandates, defeat the barbarians.  
A year after Theodosius I’s defeated the Goths internal revolt was raging. The 
usurper Magnus Maximus rallied the troops of Britain as well as Gallic troops to his side 
and invaded the Western territories of the Empire, killing Gratian in the process.129 
Theodosius managed to send an expeditionary force that defeated Maximus at Aquileia in 
AD 388. Thus Theodosius I managed to check off the second item on the imperial 
checklist, defeat usurpers. But what of the Sassanid Empire at this time, why had they not 
capitalized on the Gothic War or the revolt of Maximus to strike again at Rome? 
 The answer to the above question involves two key elements. The first was that 
Sassanid ambitions had been sufficiently achieved in the latter half of the 4th century. The 
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peace treaty imposed on Jovian after the death of Julian in AD 363 had ceded many key 
areas of Mesopotamia, and the key client state of Armenia had been partitioned in a 
manner favoring the Sassanids.130 Valens made some preliminary moves to reclaim what 
had been lost, hence his preparations at Antioch before the Battle of Adrianople, but his 
death and Theodosius’s need for a stable Eastern frontier led to tacit Roman confirmation 
of Sassanid territorial gains.  
The second element of Sassanid docility was nomadic in origin. The Romans 
were not the only people to contend with the Huns and other steppe warrior peoples. The 
Sassanids faced numerous 5th-century nomadic invasions particularly from the two 
Northern Frontier sectors, Transoxania (modern Uzbekistan) and the Caucasus. A Hunnic 
large-scale raid in AD 395 is an example of the shared nature of the nomadic threats from 
the North as both the Black sea regions of Rome and the Median and Armenian holdings 
of the Sassanids were devastated. As a result of this threat the Sassanids and Romans 
created a defense agreement whereby the Sassanids would fortify and garrison the 
northern regions against Hunnic incursions while the Romans would subsidize these 
garrisons, thus defraying the costs.131  Mutual defense born of pragmatism is another 
explanation for relative peace between the Sassanids and Romans at this time.  
After defeating the usurper Maximus, Theodosius needed a stand-in for the 
Western throne. He turned to the young son of the former Emperor Valentinian I (364- 
AD 375), Valentinian II. Coins dated to the period indicate that Theodosius played a 
guardian role for Valentinian II and though nominally in control of the entire empire, 
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Theodosius paid homage to the house of Valentinian.132 Things did not remained stable, 
however, as indicated by the apparent suicide of Valentinian II in AD 392 and the revolt 
of Flavius Eugenius.  
Eugenius was the puppet usurper of the Western magister militum, Arbogast. 
Tensions solidified in the summer of AD 392 not only because Theodosius I was led to 
believe that the young Valentinian II died as a result of foul play, but for religious 
reasons. While nominally a Christian, Eugenius had some apparent pagan sympathies and 
thus the coming conflict between Eugenius and Theodosius I had an element of Christian 
orthodoxy versus pagan revivalism.133  The end result of this tension was an Eastern 
Roman invasion of the Western Roman Empire, which culminated in the Battle of The 
Frigidus River in AD 394. The battle ended in a decisive but costly victory for 
Theodosius I. The forces of Theodosius I took casualties in excess of 10,000, out of a 
total of between 40,000 and 50,000 troops, while Eugenius’s forces took roughly 75% 
casualties, this could have been as high as 30,000.134 
This battle includes several themes and elements that are worth discussing. First, 
though nominally the head of state, true power lay not with Eugenius but his Frankish 
magister militum Arbogast, thus we see extensive power grabbing by a “barbarian” 
powerbroker even before the beginning of the fifth century. Second, the issue of Christian 
orthodoxy and pagan revivalism makes an appearance and harkens back to previous 
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discussions of Roman religious tolerance and Sassanid influence on these policies. The 
Battle of Frigidus River indicates that political and religious power had irrevocably 
become intertwined in the Roman state system in much the same way as Zoroastrianism 
linked itself decidedly to the Sassanid imperial power structure. This indicates that not 
only had Sassanid religious influences shaped Romano-Sassanid relations in a certain 
way, but it also altered the landscape of Roman domestic religious discourse. Lastly, the 
incredibly high casualties of this battle had an immediate effect on the security of the 
Roman Empire. Civil war has always had an added problem that the losses on both sides 
constituted net losses for overall Roman troop numbers. This means that the combined 
Roman losses for this single battle were in excess of 50,000.  
The Western Roman army at the time of the Battle of Frigidus River would have 
numbered somewhere in the vicinity of 113,000 comitatus forces supported by 135,000 
limitanei.135 The Eastern Roman Army was larger, with approximately 104,000 comitatus 
forces supported by 248,000 limitanei forces.136 Given these estimates, then the overall 
troop numbers of the Roman Empire on the eve of the Battle of Frigidus River were 
somewhere in the vicinity of 600,000.137 The loss of 50,000 troops, more or less, reduced 
the size of the Roman armed forces by 8%. Such a sudden loss of troops was damaging to 
the fragile stability of the empire and this burden of loss, given the outcome of the battle, 
fell on the Western Roman Empire. After the death of Theodosius I and the formal 
division of the Empire between his sons Arcadius and Honorius, the Western Roman 
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Empire even more so than the Eastern Roman Empire had to find the means to rebuild 
their forces.  
The Formal Division of the Empire: Court Intrigue, Barbarian Invasions, and 
the Decline of the Western Roman Empire (AD 395-444) 
 
 In the months following the death of Theodosius I, the new magister militum, a 
man named Stilicho, asserted himself as the power broker of the Western Roman Empire 
as Theodosius I’s son Honorius was only nine when he took the throne.138 This pattern of 
weak child emperors as figureheads and barbarian military strongmen as true 
powerbrokers was a consistent theme of the 5th century and is indicative of the changes to 
the late Roman imperial court system.  The proliferation of court intrigue and shadow 
figures controlling the reins of power was a main causal factor in the decline of the 
Western Roman Empire as internal court politics got in the way of administering the 
empire itself. Stilicho’s supremacy proved to be necessary, however, as internal and 
external threats appeared within a couple years of Honorius’s ascension to the throne.  
The first of these threats was internal, as a Roman comes, commander of a field 
army, Gildo revolted in North Africa, but under the supervision of Stilicho this threat was 
dispatched by AD 398. The next threat was external. The Goths under their leader Alaric 
emerged from the Battle of Frigidus River dissatisfied with their current position. In AD 
399 a revolt in Asia Minor allowed a man named Gainas to gain control of the Eastern 
Roman court and he promptly transferred Alaric and his provinces in the Western 
Balkans over to the West.139 In doing with Gainas stripped from Alaric the means of 
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provisioning and paying his Gothic army. Out of desperation and necessity, he turned his 
army West in order to extract favorable terms from Stilicho. 
Alaric invaded Italy in AD 401 and besieged the Western Emperor Honorius in 
Hasta Pompeia in Liguria (Northern Italy) and only retreated back to Illyricum after two 
indecisive battles with the cobbled-together forces of Stilicho. Stilicho, understanding the 
need to pacify Alaric granted him the title comes and gave him control of Dalmatia and 
Pannonia Secunda.140 The Eastern Roman Empire was plagued, at this time, by the same 
issues as the Western Roman Empire. Internal revolts, child emperors, court intrigue, and 
barbarian strong men and as a result, little support could be provided to Stilicho. Stilicho 
and his supporters fell prey to a major coup c. AD 408.141 
Stilicho’s death also meant the death of any semblance of a Western Roman 
Army and Alaric took this moment to invade Italy again for the express purpose of a 
better “deal” with the Western Roman emperor. Other ambitious men, sensing weakness, 
also acted. In AD 409 Olympius, the architect of the coup to oust Stilicho, himself fell to 
court intrigue and a usurper named Constantine III established his own power bloc in 
Gaul.142 Honorius only managed to hold onto his shred of power with the help of an 
Eastern Roman army of 4,000 men.143 In AD 410 Rome fell to Alaric due to starvation 
and this sent shockwaves through the empire.144 To make matters worse, a number of 
Germanic peoples crossed the Rhine in the first decade of the 5th century and began 
carving up portions of Gaul and Spain. It was also at this time that the population of 
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Britannia evicted the officials of the usurper Constantine III and Britannia ceased to be a 
functional part of the Western Roman Empire. These lands had either been forcefully 
taken by barbarian groups, like the Vandals, or given as part of foedus agreements to 
groups like the Visigoths.145 This trend of providing land for services was the only means 
that Western Roman Emperors truly had left for raising new armies. This policy 
highlights the rising institutions of fealty-based proto-feudalism where land was given in 
return for service.   
The Eastern Roman Empire was facing, during this period, its own set of internal 
and external problems. During the reign of Honorius’s brother Arcadius (AD 394-408), 
the Eastern Roman Empire was dominated by one of Arcadius’s ministers Rufinus, a 
court eunuch, who was ousted by Arcadius’s wife Aelia Eudoxia.146 This type of court 
domination of a weak emperor persisted beyond Arcadius’s death as his son Theodosius 
II took the throne at the age of 7. Theodosius only became the true emperor of the Eastern 
Roman Empire in AD 416, thus for this entire period under discussion both the Eastern 
and Western Roman Empires had young and/or ineffective emperors and the policies of 
each empire fell prey to the political machinations of court members. The Eastern Roman 
Empire was not only internally weak during this period of Western imperial decline but 
also faced two primary external threats. 
The Huns were a constant threat to the stability of the Balkans and groups of 
Huns led by charismatic leaders launched raids on a consistent basis. For example, in AD 
408, a Hunnic leader named Uldin led an invasion of Moesia (the Balkans) that was 
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repulsed with great difficulty.147 Other powerful leaders appeared on the scene in the 
420s such as Rua, the uncle of Attila. In AD 422, the Eastern Roman government agreed 
to pay Rua a tribute of 350 lbs of gold in exchange for keeping the peace. When the 
Roman authorities refused to increase this tribute, Rua invaded, but, fortunately for the 
Eastern Empire, he died soon after embarking on his invasion.148 This gave the Eastern 
Roman Empire a reprieve until the 440s but, as we will discuss later, the Huns returned 
even more centralized and powerful. 
Hunnic expansionism was not without its benefits for the Eastern Roman Empire. 
As we touched upon earlier, the Sassanids were forced to focus their military attention on 
the Caucasus region in order to prevent Hunnic devastation of Sassanid northern 
territories.149 The Sassanids were also forced to divert attention east as they faced another 
nomadic tribe, the Hephthalites or “White Huns”. The Sassanids fought several wars 
against both the Huns and Hephthalites. These invasions occurred throughout the 5th 
century, only ending in the 6th century. It would appear then, that the causal factor behind 
amicable 5th century relations was motivated by pragmatism; both empires were too busy 
fighting other enemies to effectively fight each other. That being said, war was never far 
off.  
  Throughout this period of time Eastern Romano-Sassanid relations remained quite 
amicable. As we discussed earlier, however, this amicable relationship was born as much 
from necessity as from any general trends of unity between the two powers. The 
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important indicator that this was a relationship of pragmatism is the extensive troop 
levels that the Eastern Roman Empire maintained along the Eastern frontier. The Notitia 
Dignatatum lists an eastern field army of 31 regiments, roughly one quarter of all field 
regiments of the Eastern Roman Empire, as well as 156 regiments of frontier troops out 
of an imperial total of 305 frontier regiments available.150 Though short in duration, the 
Romans and Sassanids had two wars during this time period under discussion, in AD 421 
and 441. These conflicts appear to have been motivated by: (1) Roman inability or refusal 
to continue subsidizing Sassanid frontier garrison in the Caucasus region and (2) religious 
conflict, specifically regarding the Christians of Armenia.151 All this points to the fact 
that the Sassanids were both a powerful and immediate threat to the Eastern Roman 
Empire, particularly because the most productive and prosperous regions of the Eastern 
Empire were threated by it.152  
 During this same period of time, AD 420-444, the same patterns of weakness 
continued in the West. Usurpers continued to fight each other, wielding barbarian forces 
as unwieldy hammers as they battered away at each other, vying for the Western imperial 
throne. The strikes of these hammers fell hard on the Western provinces and each 
usurper’s ascension and fall from grace left the Western Roman Empire shorter of 
money, in control of less land, and beholden to the whims of powerful and charismatic 
barbarian leaders. Given the issues of court intrigue destabilizing the Eastern Roman 
interior as well as the threats of both the Huns and the Sassanids, it is understandable that 
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the East was unable to send more help than it did to the West. Indeed the fact that any 
support was given at all is indicative of close ties between the two empires. In the middle 
of the 5th century, unfortunately, things went from bad to worse as Attila the Hun 
emerged as the dominant figure in the Hunnic power structure.  
Attila the Hun, Majorian, and Romulus Augustulus: The Fall of the Western 
Roman Empire (AD 444-476)   
 
 Attila the Hun managed to gather a tremendously powerful military force on the 
Hungarian Plains and from this seat of power, he was able to extract vast sums of money 
from both the Eastern and Western Roman Empires. Attila was poised at the perfect time 
to strike at the Eastern Roman Empire upon his ascension as the dominant player in 
Hunnic politics. In AD 440, the Eastern Roman Empire committed a vast sum of troops 
to a reconquest of North Africa. Though seemingly a fool’s errand, this move was a 
calculated gamble by the Eastern Roman Empire to reassert dominance over the supply 
of grain to the Italian peninsula.153 Presumably success would have breathed new life into 
the toppling Western Empire. The expedition was, unfortunately, called off as Attila 
instigated a new period of Hunnic invasions that fell heaviest on the Eastern Roman 
Empire. Attila invaded the Balkans in the early 440s and this invasion was devastating 
not only to the countryside but to cities as well. Attila brought a vast army and the 
knowledge of siege craft, which allowed him to take major cities like Viminacium and 
Naissus by assault.154 But there was a limit to Attila’s ability to attack the Eastern Roman 
Empire. 
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Constantinople occupied a chokepoint that separated its European and Asian 
holdings. While Attila could take the cities of the Balkans without too much difficulty, 
the Theodosian Walls, erected by Theodosius I a few decades prior, were vastly more 
difficult to take. Instead of needlessly losing men and legitimacy in a failed siege of 
Constantinople. Attila settled for a huge indemnity in 450.155 He then turned his attention 
West. 
In AD 451, Attila the Hun mounted a huge invasion of the Western Roman 
Empire. This could have spelled the end for the West but at the battle of the Catalaunian 
Plains, the combined forces of the Western Roman Empire and their barbarian “allies” 
living within the Empire stopped Attila’s army.156 The next year Attila again invaded, 
striking deep into Italy. A lack of supplies, disease, and Eastern Roman harassment of 
Hunnic territories in Pannonia proved enough of a hindrance for Attila to call off the 
invasion. Attila died a year later and this ended the immediate threat of the Hunnic 
Empire. 
Peace did not last long however, as the strongman at the time, Valentinian III 
murdered Aetius. Valentinian was, not long after, murdered by some of Aetius’s 
supporters, and this set forth another period of civil war that only ended in AD 457 with 
the rise of Majorian to the Western imperial throne with the backing of a Suevic king, 
Ricimer. Majorian was a successful Roman general and he represented the last push for 
Western Roman reassertion of dominance. He managed to reconquer many lost territories 
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including parts of Northern Spain and Southern Gaul.157 This slight revival was cut short 
by intrigue as rifts developed between Majorian and his barbarian allies. Majorian was 
murdered on the orders of Ricimer, which fractured Western Roman imperial loyalty as 
remaining sections of the Western Roman Empire broke away.158  In AD 467, after two 
years of no Western emperor, the Eastern Roman Empire finally managed to send an 
army west under the command of Anthemius, a successful Roman general, to restore the 
Western imperial throne. In AD 468, the Eastern Roman Empire also sent a large 
expedition to recapture North Africa. This effort was too little too late. By AD 472 
Anthemius was defeated by a Visigothic army and Rome was again captured, this time by 
Ricimer.159 
 Another Roman army sent from the East under the command of Julius Nepos 
recovered some of the territory of Italia and Nepos placed his son Romulus Augustulus 
on the Western throne. A former secretary of Attila, Orestes, promptly drove Julius 
Nepos and his Eastern Roman Army out of Italy. Orestes refused to grant a Gothic leader 
Odoacer federated status, which prompted Odoacer’s invasion of Italia in AD 476. 
Orestes was captured by troops loyal to Odoacer at Piacenza where he was executed in 
August of AD 476. At that time Odoacer installed himself as the ruler of Italia and he 
forced Romulus Augustulus to abdicate.160  
 
 
                                                        
157 Gregory of Tours. Historia Francorum, In History of the Franks: Books I-X, translated 
by Earnest Brehaut (NY: Medieval Textbooks, 1997), II.11. 
158 Guy Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, 376-568 (Cambridge: 
Medieval Textbooks, 2014), 391. 
159 Halsall Barbarian Migrations, 277. 
160 Ralph W. Mathisen, De Imperatoribus Romanis accessed from http://www.roman-
emperors.org/auggiero.htm 5/18/15 @ 12:19 pm 
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Conclusion  
 
 With the end of the Western Roman Empire properly narrated, we are now able to 
turn back to the rest of the thesis and return to the original question: what role did the 
Sassanid Empire play in the decline and fall of the Western Roman Empire? 
 In the third century the Roman Empire was rocked by decades of protracted 
internal dissent, which was made even more disastrous by the incessant and large-scale 
warfare along the eastern frontier with the Sassanids. The Sassanid Empire was, first and 
foremost, a distraction. War with the Sassanids distracted emperors from dealing with 
imperial usurpers and gave opportunistic barbarian peoples the freedom to raid and 
devastate the border regions of the Rhine and Danube frontiers. This had a particularly 
devastating effect on the Western portion of the Empire as they were forced to contribute 
both troops and tax revenue to the East, while they took the brunt of third century 
devastation. 
 Even when third-century emperors were successful in defeating internal rivals and 
subduing barbarian border incursions, many of these emperors embarked on large and 
ultimately unsuccessful campaigns against the Sassanid Empire. Julian, Valerian, and 
Gordian are all examples of emperors whose eastern ambitions proved to be their 
undoing. Not only was Sassanid expansionism a distraction, but Roman expansionism 
against the Sassanid Empire was a further distraction from the task of restoring the power 
and vitality of the Roman Empire.   
 Continual warfare with the Sassanid Empire also proved to be a catalyst for 
economic decline. As we saw in descriptions of the campaigns of emperors like Severus 
Alexander and Julian, the cost of providing the forces and support necessary for large 
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scale protracted warfare against the Sassanids was staggering, and this, coupled with 
internal usurpation and barbarian raids, all contributed to a weakening of the Roman 
economy. Depopulation, hyperinflation, and the destruction of domestic trade routes 
stagnated the economy and therefore the Roman Empire was, in the third century, forced 
to do more and more with less and less. The Sassanids, in the third century, were a 
contributory cause in the Third Century Crisis but also were a proximate cause in the 
perpetuation of the crisis. 
 Force of will, extraordinary skill, luck, and a couple decades of civil war within 
the Sassanid Empire allowed emperors like Aurelian, Carus, and Diocletian to reassert a 
modicum of stability. As we saw in the analysis of the 4th century, the Roman Empire 
was no longer the same state as before. Rigid hierarchy and hereditary professions 
replaced a civil and social structure that, while never very fluid, was in flux as slaves 
became freedmen, freedmen became citizens, and inhabitants of the Empire were allowed 
some latitude in governing there affairs. An increasingly centralized state authority began 
a new trend of heavy-handed economic, social, and by the late 4th century, religious 
policies.  These policies altered the traditional Roman value system that prized civic and 
martial participation with a hierarchy with the emperor at the center with the masses 
subservient to his will. The main sources for this change were (1) the diplomatic and 
economic interplay between the Roman and Sassanid Empires during periods of peace in 
the 4th century and (2) the constant need to provide the necessary revenue and state 
support for wars along the Rhine, Danubian, and Mesopotamian frontiers. In the short 
term, these changes allowed for a resurgence of the Roman Empire, but the long-term 
 70
implications of such changes were stoicism, asceticism, and escapism, as well as a 
general popular disconnect with the Roman imperial elites.  
These changes as well as the physical damage caused by the Sassanids, allowed 
other forces to weaken the Roman government, economy, and military in the 5th century. 
In the Western Roman Empire during this time period there was a continual lack of 
strong emperors and thus the empire fell prey to a protracted period of factionalism and 
court intrigue. The only bulwark against almost constant barbarian incursions were the 
barbarians themselves, but the cost of pitting barbarian against barbarian was the 
whittling away of Western Roman territory and coin. Every period of internal turmoil in 
the 5th century weakened the West to the point that in AD 476, the Western Roman 
Empire was too small to project any significant power. The abdication of the last Roman 
emperor was merely a symbolic end to an empire that had fallen into disrepair decades 
before. In the East a young emperor, Theodosius II did not truly emerge as a potent 
power broker until the mid 420s. By this time, wars with the Sassanids and Huns proved 
serious distractions that limited Theodosius II’s ability to aid the Western Roman Empire. 
Attempts at the end of the 430s for relief proved disastrous and a decade of defeats at the 
hands of Attila and the Huns in the 440s left the Eastern Roman Empire without the 
means to help the Western Roman Empire. By the late 460s, the Western Roman Empire 
had crossed the event horizon and was no longer a viable powerbroker in the West.    
In the end, the Sassanid Empire did not prove to be the sole causal factor in the 
decline and fall of the Western Roman Empire, but rather it was a necessary and 
contributory cause in the fall of the Western Roman Empire. It exacerbated existing 
structural weaknesses of the Roman system, distracted imperial authorities from other 
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threats, exacerbated economic weaknesses as increased military spending eroded the 
empire’s economic base and, through trade and diplomatic interplay, contributed to a 
change in late Roman court life that permitted the expansion of court intrigue. The 
Sassanid Empire was not the sole cause of the fall of the Western Roman Empire; it was 
merely one factor among many that contributed to its demise.  
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Appendix I: List of Sassanid Kings and Roman Emperors 
 
Sassanid Kings  Roman Emperors 
Ardashir I 224-239/40  Alexander Severus 22-235 
  Maximus Thrax 235-238 
  Gordian I 238 
  Gordian II 238 
  Pupienus 238 
  Balbinus 238 
Shapur I 239-272  Gordian III 238-244 
  Philip the Arab 244-249 
  Decius 249-251 
  Trebonianus Gallus 251-
253 
  Aemilianus 253 
  Valerian 253-260 
  Gallienus 253-268 
  Claudius II 268-270 
  Quintillus 270 
Hormizd I 272-273  Aurelian 270-275 
Bahram I 273-276  Tacitus 275-276 
  Florianus 276 
Bahram II 276-293  Probus 276-282 
  Carus 282-283 
  Numerian 283-284 
  Carinus 283-285 
  Diocletian 284-286 
 Western Empire Eastern Empire 
Bahram II 293  Maximian 286-305 Diocletian 286-305 
Narse 293-302   
Hormizd II 302-309   
 Constantius I 305-306 Galerius 305-311 
Adarnarse 309 Severus 306-307  
 Maxentius 306-312  
 Maximian 307-308 Licinius 308-324 
 Constantine I 306-337 Maximinus Daia 309-313 
  Re-United Empire 
Shapur II 309-379  Constantine II 337-340 
  Constans 337-350 
  Constantius II 337-361 
  Julian 361-363 
  Jovian 363-364 
  Eastern Empire 
  Valens 364-378 
Ardashir II 379-383  Theodosius I 379-395 
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Shapur III 383-388  Arcadius 395-408 
Bahram IV 388-399  Theodosius II 408-450 
Yazdgard I 399-420   
Bahram V Gor 420-439   
Yazdgard II 439-457  Marcian 450-457 
Hormizd III 457-459  Leo I 457-474 
Peroz 459-484  Leo II 474 
  Zeno 474-491 
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix II: Maps and Illustrations
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Figure 2: Relief at Naqs
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Figure 3: Outline and Overview of Dura Europos Site
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